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The title of this essay describes its topic. To see why it may be of interest, it will be 
helpful first to consider one of the central worries of Anscombe’s Intention as well as her 
method of diffusing this worry. Approximately halfway through the essay, Anscombe 
asserts that modern philosophy has « an incorrigibly contemplative conception of 
knowledge » (§32)1. For one who is trapped by such a conception, she claims, it can seem 
impossible that an agent can have non-observational knowledge of his own actions. 
Anscombe has already argued at length that such knowledge is a constitutive element of 
action (cf. §§5-20), but for someone in the grip of the incorrigibly contemplative 
conception, it will seem impossible that an agent can have this knowledge under exactly 
the same descriptions that others can observationally know his actions. Anscombe’s 
worry here crystalizes in her asking, « How can one speak of two different knowledges of 
exactly the same thing ? » (§29, original emphasis). She answers this question by shifting 
her discussion from practical knowledge to practical reasoning (cf. §§33-44) ; it is only by 
first understanding the distinctive logical form of the latter, she thinks, that we properly 
grasp the character of practical knowledge, which allows us to cast off the blinding 
incorrigibly contemplative conception and the worries it pulls in its wake (cf. §§45-50).  
The first part of this essay explains the two-knowledges/one-object worry. This sets 
the context for my main topic, viz., Anscombe’s remarks in Intention on the similarities 
and differences between intentions and commands. These remarks play a key role in her 
argument’s shift from practical knowledge to the form of practical reasoning and in its 
subsequent shift back to practical knowledge. The remarks should be seen as framing her 
account of practical reasoning’s distinctive logical form : they motivate the need for the 
account, and they are then illuminated by the account in order to resolve the two-
knowledges/one-object puzzle. I tackle these exegetical issues over the course of the 
essay, but my goals are not limited to exegesis2. I think there are lessons both in the 
                                                        
1 Unless otherwise noted, all in-line citations are to Anscombe, Intention, Oxford, Blackwell, 1963. 
2 As far as exegesis goes, however, the importance of Anscombe’s remarks in Intention on intentions and 
commands has gone overlooked. See, for example, the summary of Intention in F. Stoutland, « Summary of 
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philosophy of mind and in ethics to be gleaned from a close study of these remarks on 
intentions and commands. Intentions, we discover, must not be understood as self-
commands ; once we see why, we can better understand Anscombe’s rather cryptic 
dismissal of Kantian ethics in « Modern Moral Philosophy ». The essay closes on this last 
point. 
 
1. The two-knowledges/one-object puzzle 
Let us open by reviewing Anscombe’s remarks on the incorrigibly contemplative 
conception of knowledge that plagues contemporary philosophy. According to such a 
conception, there can be no knowledge, properly speaking, of the worldly results of the 
performance of an intentional action prior to or during the performance of the action. On 
this incorrigibly contemplative conception, facts are necessarily prior to knowledge, and 
since one cannot know a fact that is not yet the case, one cannot know what one does 
through an intentional action until the action has produced its result. All one can know 
about one’s own intentional activity prior to its completion is some psychological fact that 
already obtains, viz., the intention, considered as a sort of plan on which one acts. 
Anscombe rejects this view. We learn near the text’s end that she takes her arguments 
against this view to vindicate the Thomistic idea that « [p]ractical knowledge is “the cause 
of what it understands”, unlike “speculative” knowledge, which “is derived from objects 
known” » (§48)3. 
The textual road to this conception of practical knowledge takes many twists and 
turns. One of the first is to introduce the idea of non-observational self-knowledge, the 
general sort of knowledge to which practical knowledge, Anscombe thinks, belongs as a 
species. Assuming that such knowledge exists and practical knowledge is a species of the 
genus, we might ask : what is the object of practical knowledge ? Towards answering this 
question, Anscombe invites us to think of what such knowledge would have to be like on 
the incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge that she seeks to reject. Critically, 
she thinks that adherence to this conception commits one to the view that practical 
knowledge has its own sort of object, distinct from the sort of object that belongs to 
                                                        
Anscombe’s Intention », in A. Ford et al. ed., Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, Harvard University Press, 2011, 
p. 23-32. Stoutland pays no attention to Anscombe’s comments on commands in §2, §20 or §§31-32 in spite 
of their central place in those sections. The only mention he makes of commands is of the builder’s 
instructions in the notorious §45. If my essay is successful, it will show that this is a nontrivial oversight on 
Stoutland’s part. 
3 Anscombe cites Aquinas here at Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. I. 
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observational knowledge. This, in turn, commits one to rejecting that a person could ever 
know by observation what another person knows non-observationally.  
To see how one could arrive at such a view, consider her famous example of the man 
pumping water (§§23-31). The man is pumping water with the aim of replenishing the 
house water-supply. Imagine an observer who watches the man and who can see whether 
there are any holes in the pipe between the pump and the house. In the good case, there 
are no holes, and the pumper succeeds in his task. It might seem in this case that the 
observer can know through observation what the pumper knows by acting, viz., that the 
pumper is replenishing the house water-supply. If this is right, then we have two distinct 
ways of knowing of one and the same fact. Perhaps, however, the apparent identity here 
is illusory. If there is a hole in the pipe, then the observer may know that the house water-
supply is not being replenished even though the pumper believes that it is. If the pumper 
has non-observational knowledge of what he does here – and, at this point in the text, 
Anscombe takes herself to be entitled to say that he non-observationally knows 
something about his action – then it seems his knowledge cannot be that he is replenishing 
the water supply, for the supply is not being replenished.  
Maybe, then, what he non-observationally knows is only that he is trying to 
replenish the house water-supply ; maybe that one is trying to do something is all one can 
ever know non-observationally about one’s actions. If that is so, however, then the 
observer and the pumper do not know the same sort of fact : the observer knows, in 
Anscombe’s words, « what happens » (§29), whereas the object of the pumper’s non-
observational knowledge is merely the psychological datum that accords with his 
attempt. This is not Anscombe’s view ; as Michael Thompson puts it, « Anscombe’s 
practical knowledge is precisely self-knowledge in respect of what might in principle be 
observed4 ». She insists that, in spite of what the water pumper example might seem to 
demonstrate, at least in the good case, the observer and the pumper do indeed have 
knowledge of one and the same fact, viz., that the pumper is replenishing the house water-
supply5. 
 
                                                        
4 M. Thompson, « Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge », in A. Ford et al. ed., Essays on Anscombe’s 
Intention, op. cit., p. 201. 
5 The good case is the one in which the house water-supply is successfully replenished. I want presently to 
remain neutral about the bad case, in which there is a hole in the pipe. I will take up that matter at the end 
of section 3. 
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2. Intentions and Commands 
To understand Anscombe’s insistence here, we must, I think, understand why she 
endorses the Thomistic analysis of practical knowledge as « the cause of what it 
understands » (§48), which she gives in §§45-49. Anscombe think that bringing this into 
view requires first understanding the distinctive logical form of practical reasoning ; 
« [t]he notion of “practical knowledge” », she says, « can only be understood if we first 
understand “practical reasoning” » (§33). She gives her account of practical reasoning in 
§§33-44. Now if we look at the sections that frame this account, §32 and §45, we find some 
striking commonalities. In each of these, she aims to get explanatory work out of 
Theophrastus’s remark concerning mistakes of performance, and in each of these she 
compares intentions to commands. My goal in this and the following section will be to 
explain the importance of this frame to answering the two-knowledges/one-object 
puzzle. The frame itself, however, is best understood in terms of Anscombe’s broader 
thoughts on intentions and commands, so we will do well to start by analyzing these. 
 One does not have to get very far in Intention to find remarks on the topic. In §2, 
Anscombe entertains the idea that expressions of intentions might be a species of 
prediction, alongside estimates, prophesies, and, importantly, commands. We are not told 
much about estimates or prophesies, but we do learn quite a bit about commands. 
Anscombe says that a command is « a description of a future action, addressed to the 
prospective agent, and cast in a form whose point in the language is to make the person 
do what is described ». « An order will usually be given with some intention or another », 
she claims, « but is not as such the expression of a volition ; it is simply a description of an 
action cast in a special form ». She also tells us that « [e]xecution-conditions for 
commands correspond to truth-conditions for propositions ». Finally, we learn that 
« [t]he reasons justifying an order are not ones suggesting what is probable, or likely to 
happen, but e.g. ones suggesting what it would be good to make happen with a view to an 
objective, or with a view to a sound objective. In this regard, commands and expressions 
of intentions are similar ». 
The reader familiar with Intention will note a number of important elements from 
Anscombe’s overall view articulated in these early remarks. She starts by characterizing 
commands in terms of actions, going so far as to suggest that they are simply a special 
form of action-description. The latter point might seem odd, but the characterization of 
commands in terms of actions should seem intuitive, if not obvious. Note, however, that 
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this suggests that a proper account of commands presupposes an adequate account of 
action ; this order of explanation turns out to be the correct one for intentions as well. 
Next, commands have execution-conditions, not truth-conditions. The fact that 
commands have something other than truth-conditions also might seem intuitive, if not 
obvious6. By noting this, though, our attention is drawn to the very idea of success being 
a matter, not of truth, but of execution ; intentions too are successful if they are 
successfully executed. This connects with the last point, where Anscombe explicitly 
compares commands with expressions of intentions. Both, she notes, are justified by 
appealing to the goodness of what they aim to bring about, not by citing evidence. This 
fact about the way that practical reasons justify plays a central role throughout Intention 
(cf., inter alia, §§3, 5, 9, and 20). 
There is one more point to make before leaving §2. In its antepenultimate 
paragraph, Anscombe says that « [i]n some cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for 
not being in accordance with the words, rather than vice versa. This is sometimes so when 
I change my mind ; but another case occurs when e.g. I write something other than I think 
I am writing : as Theophrastus says (Magna Moralia, 1189b 22), the mistake here is one 
of performance, not of judgment ». As I have already noted, and as we shall presently 
investigate, this quip from Aristotle’s pupil frames Anscombe’s discussion of the form of 
practical reasoning. Indeed, it appears to be her final answer to the most pressing version 
of the two-knowledges/one-object puzzle. The other two occasions she cites the quip 
come on the heels of comparing intentions and commands ; it should not be a surprise, 
then, that this is likewise true of the first time she invokes the phrase. 
Having reviewed these early remarks on intentions and commands, let us turn now 
to her comments on the topic from the middle of the text, which arise in the context of the 
two-knowledges/one-object puzzle 7 . In §31 Anscombe suggests that we can « try to 
                                                        
6 Obvious though it might seem, several attempts to analyze imperatives (and so, in turn, commands) truth-
conditionally exist. See, e.g., D. Lewis, « General Semantics », Synthese, 22, 1970, p. 18-67 and M. Kaufmann, 
Interpreting Imperatives, Dortrecht, Springer, 2012. For a critical review of these and other accounts of 
imperatives, as well as a positive view inspired by H.-N. Castañeda (Thinking and Doing, Dortrecht Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1975), see M. Chrisman and G. Hubbs, « The Practitional Approach to Imperatives » 
(unpublished). 
7 There is one other extended treatment of commands in Intention, which occurs at §20. Thompson calls 
this section, along with §19, « all important » (M. Thompson, « Anscombe’s Intention and Practical 
Knowledge », art. cit., p. 207). Her topic in §20 is whether « intentional actions would still have the 
characteristic ‘intentional’, if there were no such thing as expression of intention for the future, or as further 
intention in acting ? » She entertains some ways in which one might try to answer this question in the 
affirmative ; one of these is to imagine that the only answer to her famous question « Why ? » is « I just am, 
that’s all ». Under this presumption, « Why ? » cannot distinguish between intentional actions and « such 
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sketch a solution » to it by reflection on the contradictory to a description of one’s own 
intentional action. Her goal is to show that we do not contradict a person’s description of 
his intentional action in the same way that we contradict an observer’s description of that 
intentional action, even when the two descriptions do not differ in sense and are of one 
and the same action. It should be obvious how one contradicts an observational report of 
someone else’s activity : one mentions some fact(s) that demonstrate the report to be 
false. Consider the pumper again : if I see a man pumping water and tell you, « That man 
is replenishing the house water-supply », you can contradict my report by saying, « No he 
is not ; there is a hole in the pipe ». When we reflect on commands, we see that 
contradiction requires something other than a conflicting observational report. 
Anscombe shows this with her entertaining example of the court-martialed soldier. The 
soldier has false teeth, and upon being ordered by a doctor to clench his teeth, he takes 
them out, hands them to the doctor, and tells the doctor to clench them. An observer with 
adequate knowledge of the soldier might have correctly predicted, after hearing the 
doctor’s order, that the soldier would not clench his teeth ; such a prediction is justified 
by the fact that conditions are not such that the order can be successfully executed. A 
description of this fact, however, is not the contradiction of an order. Anscombe says that 
the contradiction of the order is the order, « Do not clench your teeth » ; consistent with 
all else she says in this section we may take the disobedient refusal, « I will not clench my 
teeth », when offered by a normally-toothed person, also to be a contradiction of the 
order. These both are contradictions to the order because they deny that there will be 
teeth-clenching, not because there are no teeth to clench, but by rejecting the end of teeth-
clenching. In one case the end is rejected by making an order whose end (non-teeth-
clenching) is incompatible with teeth-clenching ; in the other case the end is rejected by 
disobediently refusing the order.  
Analogously, to contradict someone’s description of what he is doing, Anscombe 
claims, we do not offer contradicting facts but rather act so as to thwart his end. If I ask 
the man pumping the water what he is doing and he says, « Replenishing the house water-
supply », then if I tell him he is wrong because there is a hole in the pipe, then I do not 
                                                        
things as starts and gasps ». But might there still be, she wonders, some other way of marking the necessary 
distinction ? It is at this point that she notes that « [a] voluntary action can be commanded ». So, she says, 
« we can suppose that human actions, which are not distinguished by the way their agents know them, are 
or are not subject to command. If they are subject to command they can be distinguished as a separate 
class ». This is not illuminating, however : « the distinction seems to be an idle one, just made for its own 
sake ».  
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thereby contradict his description of his intentional activity, any more than the soldier 
contradicts the doctor by indicating that there cannot be teeth-clenching. What I do in 
offering such a response is tell him that conditions are such that his intentional activity 
cannot be successfully executed. To contradict the water-pumper’s description of his 
intentional activity I must do something to deny his end ; Anscombe’s specific example is, 
to the man’s saying, « I am replenishing the house water-supply », the response, « “Oh, no, 
you aren’t” said by someone who thereupon sets out e.g. to make a hole in the pipe with a 
pick-axe » (§31).  
In a recent discussion of these examples, Adrian Haddock says that, if we want to 
put Anscombe’s point here « rather grandly », it is that « contradictories must be of the 
same logical order8 ». The invocation of a logical order gets right to the heart of the matter. 
Anscombe’s goal is to respond to the person who thinks that the object of the pumper’s 
non-observational knowledge cannot be « what happens ». This person thinks that if the 
pipe is busted, then the pumper cannot non-observationally know that he is replenishing 
the house water-supply, because the supply is not being replenished. This complaint can 
only get a grip, however, if the observationally-grounded statement « The house water-
supply is not being replenished » contradicts the pumper’s non-observational description 
of what he is doing. In general, if one statement does not contradict another, then the truth 
of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter, even if the two statements are in some 
other way at odds. Anscombe is claiming here that the truth of the observation sentence 
about the pipe cannot contradict the pumper’s non-observational self-description, not 
because the two sentences lack conflicting contents – indeed, the contents are at odds 
with one another – but because of their differing logical orders or, put another way, forms. 
If this is correct, then from observation claims about the pipe, nothing immediately 
follows regarding the pumper’s non-observational self-knowledge. Specifically, it does 
not follow that the only non-observational self-knowledge he can have is of some non-
observable psychological fact ; the possibility that the self-knowledge is not merely 
psychological remains live. If the possibility is live in the bad cases, then it is in the good 
ones as well, and the two-knowledges/one-object view is plausible, if only, perhaps, in the 
good cases. 
Although the comparison between intentions and commands makes the two-
                                                        
8 A. Haddock, « The Knowledge that a Man Has, in A. Ford et al. ed., Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, op. cit., 
p. 158 (original emphasis). 
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knowledge/one-object view plausible, it does not establish it. Establishing the view 
requires explicating the logical form of practical reasoning and practical knowledge. In 
preparation for this explication, Anscombe again draws comparisons between intentions 
and commands. As she has already noted (and we have already observed) in §2, both 
intentions and commands specify ends to be brought about ; both the formation of an 
intention and the expression of a command determine correctness conditions that are 
execution-based rather than truth-based. Intentions, however, are not a species of 
command – they are not a sort of self-produced self-obligating command. Anscombe 
explains why at the end of §31 when, speaking of an agent’s description of his intentional 
action, she says, « we say that the agent’s description is a piece of knowledge, but an order 
is not a piece of knowledge ». Anscombe builds on these remarks in the next section, 
turning her attention to the ways in which intentions and commands can fail to be 
executed. There are at least two distinct ways in which an order can fail to be executed : 
either the person ordered to carry out the command can disobediently refuse to act on 
the order, or he can attempt to carry out the order but fail to execute it successfully. The 
latter case, Anscombe notes, is « precisely analogous » to that in which a person fails to 
carry out an intention he sets before himself (§32). The adoption of an intention involves 
accepting execution conditions just as does accepting an order – indeed, one cannot accept 
an order without forming an intention to bring about the end specified by that order. If 
one fails to carry out either an intention or an order, it is, in the words of Theophrastus, a 
mistake of performance, not of judgment. The rejection of an order, by contrast, involves 
no such failure on the part of the disobedient party : to reject an order is to refuse to form 
an intention in accordance with that order. In this case there can be neither success nor 
failure of performance, for that there is to be the relevant performance is itself rejected.  
Anscombe will return to this line of thought in §45 when she gives her answer to the 
two-knowledges/one-object problem. She cannot give that answer yet, however, for 
although the parallelism between intentions and commands « is interesting and 
illuminates the periphery of the problem, it fails at the centre and leaves us in that 
darkness that we have found ourselves in » (§31). We have just noted why we remain in 
the darkness : « an order is not a piece of knowledge ». To get us out « of the utter 
darkness in which we [find] ourselves » (§32), we must first understand practical 
reasoning ; again, « [t]he notion of “practical knowledge” can only be understood if we 
first understand “practical reasoning” » (§33). The key to understanding practical 
Klesis – 2016 : 35 – Lectures contemporaines de Elisabeth Anscombe 
 98 
reasoning is to recognize that acts of practical reasoning do not result in beliefs about 
what to do but rather in intentional actions.  
This is not to say, of course, that in all cases of practical reasoning what immediately 
follows from the act of reasoning is action in accordance with its conclusion, for often 
when practical reasoning concludes circumstances are not proper for acting on the 
conclusion. In these cases, what one forms when practical reasoning has gone well is an 
intention to act when circumstances are appropriate. This intention, however, cannot be 
understood independently of the action that would realize it. The fundamental conclusion 
of an act of practical reasoning is to bring about the end that the reasoning has determined 
is to be brought about, so the relevant intention is just the commitment to act towards the 
realization of that end when circumstances are appropriate. This is not all that practical 
reasoning brings about, however ; because it is reasoning, it also generates knowledge. 
The object of this knowledge is the conclusion of the act of reasoning – this is knowledge, 
in Anscombe’s phrase, of « what happens »9.  
 
3. Intentions, Commands, and Practical Knowledge  
This point allows us readers to emerge in §45 from the darkness and say what 
practical knowledge is such that it is, to take Thompson’s phrase again, « precisely self-
knowledge in respect of what might in principle be observed ». Anscombe’s example here 
is of the person who directs the construction of a building without ever seeing the building 
or getting reports of its progress. Although this person never observes what gets done 
during the construction of the building, Anscombe tells us that he knows what gets done 
and that « (h)is knowledge of what is done is practical knowledge » (§45, original 
emphasis). The object of this knowledge is the construction of the building, which can also 
be known through observation by anyone (including the builder himself) who might pass 
by and see the workers constructing the building. That anything gets done, however, 
requires that the person give orders. Once again, then, we see the nature of intention 
explicated by comparing it to the nature of commands. 
Having presented this example, Anscombe immediately considers the obvious 
                                                        
9 The idea that in the paradigmatic case practical reasoning results in action plays an important role in R. 
Moran (Authority and Estrangement, Princeton University Press, 2001) and P. Hieronymi (« The Will as 
Reason », Philosophical Perspectives 23, 2009, p. 201-220). For a discussion of the way that practical 
reasoning resulting in an intention to act in the future relates to the future action, see L. Ferrero 
(« Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor », Philosophers Imprint 10 (2), 
2010, p. 1-23).  
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objection to it, which can be put as follows : if the person has knowledge of the building’s 
construction – and even this might be doubtful – it is only if the orders have been executed. 
But what if the orders are not executed, either due to incompetence or to disobedience ? 
Then whatever the builder seems to know is not the case. To this we might add : so all the 
person really knows is what orders he has given, not whether they have been or are being 
acted on. To this Anscombe says, « Orders. . . can be disobeyed, and intentions fail to get 
executed » (§45). By issuing the commands that he does, the builder determines what is 
to be done. From his point of view, however, each command not only determines 
something to be done but also is the first step towards bringing about what is to be 
brought about. Because the process is initiated by the command, it is something that is 
happening, and because it is something that is happening, it is a proper object of 
knowledge, whether or not the command itself is disobeyed by the workers. What makes 
the builder’s knowledge of what is done a bit of practical knowledge is that an execution 
condition concerning what is to be done has been established. Whether or not it is fulfilled 
is a matter of performance. 
The point Anscombe makes here about the builder’s commands pertains generally 
to all intentions, whether or not commands are involved in establishing the relevant 
execution conditions. To intend to do something is to accept that some execution 
condition is to be fulfilled. When a person acts intentionally, she knows the end that she 
seeks to bring about, whether or not she is able to bring it about. If her end fails to be 
realized, then, Anscombe claims, the mistake is in the performance, not in the judgment – 
the object of knowledge is the same whether the performance is successful or faulty. This 
is so even if the intention never manifests itself in bodily movement. The formation of an 
intention is the first step towards bringing about what is to be brought about, so the only 
way an intention can fail without being given up is for there to be a failure of performance. 
Even when an intention fails to result in anything getting done, the intender’s knowledge 
of her intention is, in a sense, knowledge of what is done. 
It is not out of line to ask here : but in what sense, exactly ? If the workers respond 
to the builder’s order by immediately going on strike, in what sense is a house being built ? 
An if there is no sense in which it is being built, how can the builder know that it is being 
built ? There is a real worry here, and answering it, I think, requires not just exegesis but 
also some interpreting. The interpretation I shall offer proceeds in two steps. The first is 
to highlight a contrast between intentions and commands, a contrast that resolves an 
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apparent contradiction in §45. As we noted in the last section, Anscombe says in §32 that 
the mistake of performance through which an intention fails to realize its end is 
« precisely analogous » to the mistake of performance through which one tries, but fails, 
to execute an order. She explicitly contrasts this sort of failure with that of disobeying an 
order. But now, in §45, she tells us that « orders… can be disobeyed, and intentions fail to 
get executed », evidently indicating a parallelism between disobedience and the mistake 
of performance through which intentions fail to get executed. Has she contradicted 
herself ? 
No. The difference here is that in the first example the order is considered from the 
point of view of the person to whom the order is given and who in turn accepts it, whereas 
in the latter case the order is considered from the point of view of the person who gives 
the order. In the first example, the failure of performance is at once a failure to satisfy an 
intention and to execute an order. The person in this case has accepted the order, and in 
accepting the order the person forms an intention to achieve the end it specifies. To fail to 
execute the order just is to fail to satisfy the corresponding intention. Were the person in 
this case to refuse the order disobediently, he would thereby refuse to form the relevant 
intention, and so there would be no performance at which he could fail. Things are 
different with the builder. He gives the order, and thereby establishes execution 
conditions, but his conditions can fail to be fulfilled either because they are adopted but 
unsuccessfully executed or, simply, because his order is disobeyed and the conditions are 
not adopted in an intention. From the perspective of the builder, both sorts of failure are 
mistakes of performance, for his ends are established through his commands. Whether 
these ends fail to be met either because they are adopted but unsuccessfully executed by 
others or because they are disobediently rejected, for him the failure is one of 
performance, not of judgment.  
This point is important, for it indicates a crucial difference between intentions and 
commands. In the normal case, a command is successfully executed because the person 
who has been ordered to carry it out accepts it and forms an intention whose ends accord 
with that of the command. A command can fail to be executed in either of the two ways 
just mentioned, but in either case, the command and the ends determined by the 
command still stand, simply because the command has been issued. From the point of 
view of the person issuing the command, either sort of failure constitutes a failure of 
performance, but from the point of view of the person to whom the order is issued, 
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disobedience does not involve any failure of performance. Intentions differ because there 
is no point of view from which they can fail to be executed but not involve a failure of 
performance ; there is no analogue to disobedience in the case of intentions. For there to 
be an analogue, it would have to be possible at once to determine an end to be brought 
about, as the commander does when she issues a command, and simultaneously to reject 
it, as the commanded does when he disobeys that command. With intentions, if the end is 
determined, then the intention is formed, and if it is rejected, there is no intention – either 
the end is determined and is accepted, or there is no end because there is no intention.  
Even though Anscombe herself does not use the comparison to make this point, this 
difference between intentions and commands closes the space between intending and 
failing to act. Maybe we should disagree with her that the builder has knowledge of what 
is done ; if the workers go on strike, then maybe there is no sense in which the builder 
knows that the house is being built, because there is no sense in which it is being built. 
Even if this is correct, no parallel sort of failure is possible when one forms an intention, 
for disobedience properly speaking is impossible. So whereas the builder might have no 
knowledge of what is done because the relevant intentions – viz., the workers’ – are 
absent, in the single-person case the determination of the ends just is the formation of the 
intention, so a proper object of knowledge exists. Culling this claim from Intention is the 
first of the two interpretive moves I mentioned a few paragraphs back.  
The second is to render Anscombe’s claim that practical knowledge is knowledge of 
what happens a bit more precise by saying it is, in the first place, knowledge of what is 
happening. This move is inspired by Thompson’s work on the imperfective aspect of 
action-descriptions10. Indeed, it is not merely inspired by Thompson, but it is Thompson’s 
own take on this matter. He says that « [t]he content of Anscombe’s practical knowledge 
is progressive, imperfective, in media res. Its character as knowledge is not affected when 
the hydrogen bomb goes off and most of what the agent is doing never gets done11 ». 
Imagine the pumper pumping away with the pipe intact and the water on its way to the 
cistern. Before the water arrives, a hydrogen bomb goes off, and all is obliterated. The 
house water-supply then did not get replenished, but it is nevertheless true that the 
pumper was replenishing the house water-supply ; he simply failed in his performance.  
Haddock, also drawing on Thompson, also makes this move. He discusses 
                                                        
10 M. Thompson, Life and Action, Harvard University Press, 2008, esp. Part II) 
11 M. Thompson, « Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge », art. cit., p. 209. 
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Anscombe’s other example of a failure of performance, which is unsuccessfully writing « I 
am a fool » on a chalkboard without observing one’s lack of success. The action fails 
because the chalk gives out ; one does not notice because one is blindfolded (§45 ; cf. §29). 
Haddock notes that if he were not blindfolded and saw that a sentence he was writing was 
failing to be written, he would « just pick up a new bit of chalk from the desk. [This] is a 
way of acknowledging the broadness of the progressive – a phenomenon to which 
Anscombe explicitly draws our attention – to acknowledge that I am still writing ‘I am a 
fool’ on the blackboard when I am picking up the new bit of chalk12 ». A disruption of 
performance is not a failure to have been performing. A person can thus know what he is 
doing even if he does not do it seamlessly (Haddock’s point) and even if the seamlessness 
prevents the action from achieving its goal (Thompson’s point). 
This, then, would seem to be Anscombe’s ultimate answer to the two-
knowledges/one-object puzzle13. When a person forms an intention, she knows that a set 
of execution conditions has been established, and she knows what these conditions are. 
The establishment of the conditions is the first step in the process that aims at satisfying 
them, so knowledge of the conditions is also knowledge that the process of satisfying them 
has begun. She cannot know whether the process is going well, however, except by 
observation. If, unbeknownst to her, other conditions are impeding the process, an 
observer may know about the impediment and thereby know that she is failing at her goal. 
Should he express this observation, he will say something that might sound like a 
contradiction of her expression of what she is intentionally doing. It is not, however, for it 
does not contradict what she knows, viz., the goal she is pursuing and that she is pursuing 
the goal. In the good case, however, the pursuit of her goal is also a possible object of an 
observer : he can observe, and through his observation know, the fact that she is pursuing 
that goal, which is the very fact she knows by pursuing her goal. Thus it is that the two 
distinct sorts of knowledge can have one and the same object. 
 
4. Intentions and the Problem of « Legislating for Oneself » 
In the last section, I claimed that the defense of Anscombe from charges of self-
contradiction displays an important way in which intentions differ from commands. The 
                                                        
12 A. Haddock, « The Knowledge that a Man Has, art. cit., p. 168. Footnotes omitted. The omitted footnotes 
cite Thompson (Life and Action, op. cit., Part II) as well as §23 of Intention. 
13   Not everyone agrees : for an alternative reading of Anscombe on this point, see J. Schwenkler, 
« Understanding Practical Knowledge », Philosophers’ Imprint, 15 (15), 2015, p. 20-22. 
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point is worth revisiting, for it can also help us make sense of Anscombe’s somewhat 
obscure dismissal of Kant (and one might worry, Kantianism in general) in « Modern 
Moral Philosophy ». Here is her repudiation :  
« Kant introduces the idea of “legislating for oneself”, which is as absurd as if in these 
days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective 
decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is 
overwhelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires the superior 
power in the legislator. His own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so 
intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as 
anything but just a lie (e.g. as “a lie in such-and-such circumstances”). His rule about 
universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a 
relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it14. » 
The point at the end that all action is action under a description will be familiar to 
any Anscombe reader ; I will set aside whether it tells against Kant’s discussion of lying15. 
What interests me is her apparent dismissal of the idea of self-legislation. The idea that 
reason can, and indeed should, legislate what a person does would seem to be as old as 
Western Philosophy itself – Plato seems to say as much when he asserts that the just 
person’s actions are controlled by the rational part of her soul16. It is striking, then, that 
Anscombe calls the idea « absurd » and discards it after only two sentences of discussion. 
To be sure, she devotes more time than this over the course of the essay arguing against 
a legislative conception of ethics, but we hear no more about the absurdity of self-
legislation. 
If we bring the discussion of this essay to bear on Anscombe’s dismissal, however, 
we can construct a rationale for her remarks17. Recall the first of the two interpretive 
moves form the last section, which argued that intentions can only fail due to a failure of 
performance. Commands differ, for they can fail to be executed due to disobedience. 
                                                        
14 G. E. M. Anscombe, « Modern Moral Philosophy », Philosophy 33, 1958, p. 2. 
15 I doubt that it does. For a recent discussion of Kant’s remarks on lying that, I think, shows how Kant can 
be saved from Anscombe’s complaint, see H. Varden (« Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One 
More Time : Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis », Journal of Social Philosophy 41, 
2010, p. 403-421). For Anscombe’s remarks on actions always being actions under a description, see, inter 
alia, §§6, 23, 26, 35, and 38.  
16  I hedge this claim with « seems », for one might object that self-control is an executive matter, which 
differs from self-legislation. Even if there is a meaningful distinction here, it is still a bit boggling how blithely 
Anscombe dismisses the self-legislation view.  
17  Other, compatible rationales may also be constructed. For example, the problem with self-legislation 
might be that it requires a person to give herself a rule in a way that any good Wittgensteinian will deny is 
possible. See McDowell (Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge (US), Harvard University Press, 1998, Part III) 
for what a good Wittgensteinian thinks and says on these matters. I will not elaborate on this possibility 
here, except to say that it does not seem to be a competitor to the one I am offering. 
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Disobedience is possible with commands because commanding involves a pair of agents, 
each with his own power vis-à-vis the command : the commander exercises the 
(presumably) legitimate power of setting an end for the commanded, and the commanded 
exercises the (presumably) illegitimate power of rejecting the end. For self-legislation to 
be possible, a person would have to be capable of standing to herself both as a superior 
power, which enacts the legislation, and an inferior power, which can obey or disobey the 
legislation. But this, as we saw earlier, is absurd. When a person sets or restricts her own 
ends, she does so by forming intentions. There is no possible gap between the setting or 
restricting of the end and the formation of the intention – to put this in a slogan, to set is 
to form. This is not true of legislation. To enact legislation is either to set an end or to 
establish restrictions on what ends may be set. The enactment of the legislation does not 
thereby form all of the intentions necessary for carrying the legislation out, however, for 
disobedient refusal is always a possibility. Reflective decision-making, then, is not a sort 
of self-legislation, for the former leaves no room for the possibility of disobedience that is 
always present with the latter. 
Once we see this, we can also see why Anscombe thinks that treating all reflective 
decision-making as a 1-0 vote is absurd. In a normal case of voting, a voter who is in the 
midst of casting his vote cannot be certain that the side for which he is voting will win the 
day. We can articulate this commonplace by saying that there is a gap between what this 
voter decides and what ends up being decided as a result of the vote. This is the same gap 
that exists between commander and commanded. The voter voting is like the commander 
commanding : we can think of the voter’s vote as commanding that his side win the day. 
But just as the commander’s command can be denied by a separate power, the voter’s 
vote can be denied by a separate power, viz., the votes of those who oppose his side. No 
such gap exists in reflective decision-making. When a person makes a decision, she does 
not have to wait – literally, metaphorically, or in any other way – to see if her decision will 
win the day, for there is no gap between making the decision and the result of doing so. 
Again, with decision-making, to set is to form. When we consider the dynamics of both 
making and enforcing the law in the context of Anscombe’s discussion of intentions and 
commands, then, we have a rationale through which we can understand her dismissive 
remarks about self-legislation. 
To understand these remarks, however, is not to endorse them, at least not fully. We 
might agree with her that the idea of individual self-legislation, taken literally, is absurd, 
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without going on to say that modeling ethics as a sort of self-legislation is in turn absurd. 
We can find room for a non-absurd model of self-legislation if the self in question is not 
individual, always winning its vote 1-0, but plural, a collective to which the individual 
belongs but with which she can also find herself at odds. Conceived of from this person’s 
point of view, ethics is a matter of what we decide and thereby legislate, but the fact that 
we make a given decision does not guarantee that I will form all of the needed intentions 
to carry it out. There is a gap between decision and intention – here, to set is not to form. 
Seen this way, Anscombe’s dismissal of self-legislation should be taken as showing the 
absurdity of individual self-legislation, which then poses the philosophical tasks of 
clarifying collective selfhood, collective decision-making, and collective intentionality.18 If 
the basic tack of this essay has been correct, the proper execution of these tasks will keep 
careful track of the differences between intentions and commands.19 
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